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Abstract
Canadian and American securities market regulators have
differing approaches to enforcement. In this article, we present the
results of an empirical study comparing a highly salient aspect of
securities enforcement—insider trading—in Canada and the
United States. We reach a number of important findings. First,
adjusting for trading volume, Canada has a greater intensity of
enforcement when compared to the U.S. Second, Canadian
securities regulators primarily concern themselves with insider
trading in Canadian companies, while the SEC brings more
enforcement actions involving insider trading in companies
incorporated outside the U.S. Third, we do not find significant
differences in the fraction of actions involving multiple traded
companies between Canada and the U.S. However, we do see that
U.S. investigations involve a significantly greater number of
defendants and that the SEC is more than twice as likely to pursue
tippers or tippees (although we observe no significant difference
in the likelihood that top insiders will be pursued). Fourth, we find
that U.S. cases are significantly more likely to result in a criminal
referral leading to prosecution. Fifth, we find that settlements are
more likely in the U.S. Finally, in terms of monetary penalties, we
find no significant difference between the two countries. However,
we do find that Canada is more likely to apply a bar as a sanction,
but if a bar is applied, the U.S. is more likely to make the bar
permanent. These findings neither demonstrate a need for
systemic reform in either jurisdiction nor suggest that centralized
regulation is necessarily better from an enforcement perspective.
But, they do provide insight into the differing points of regulatory
emphasis in two jurisdictions. From a comparative perspective,
our research thus allows securities regulators to begin to evaluate
whether their enforcement approach is optimal on the basis of
quantitative data.
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1. Introduction

The securities markets of Canada and the United States
are closely integrated. A significant number of public companies
are listed on stock exchanges in both countries, encouraged by
coordinated disclosure and offering requirements that facilitate
capital raising on both sides of the border. One aspect of
securities regulation, however, remains largely distinct:
enforcement. Although provincial securities regulators in
Canada have entered into memoranda of understanding with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to facilitate
investigations involving conduct in both countries, the
enforcement regimes remain separate.1 Moreover, the two
countries have different regulatory structures, with provincial
and territorial securities commissions playing the principal role
in Canada, whereas the SEC overshadows state securities
regulators in the U.S. These differences in regulatory structure
invite a comparison of the two approaches. Moreover, there is a
long-standing and lively debate in Canada over whether to move
to a national or “cooperative” regulator, modeled to some extent
on the SEC. This debate, however, suffers from a dearth of
empirical evidence comparing the two alternative regulatory
models.2
In this article, we present the results of an empirical study
comparing a highly salient aspect of securities enforcement—
insider trading—in Canada and the U.S. The SEC has greater
resources, greater economies of scale, and more experience in
bringing insider trading actions. These factors suggest that the
SEC will have the capacity to bring more insider trading actions
than its Canadian counterparts. In order to test this and related
hypotheses, we identified insider trading enforcement actions
brought by provincial securities regulators in Canada and the
SEC in the U.S. from 2005 to 2015. For these actions, we
collected data on industry, number and type of defendants, time
to resolution, and sanctions imposed. Our data are crosssectional in nature and thus, our findings are largely based on
correlations. Nonetheless, we believe that our findings mark a
Enforcement within Canada can differ among Canadian provinces and
territories. We take this point into account in our empirical analysis.
2 See generally, for a comparison of public and private enforcement in
Canada and the U.S., Poonam Puri, “Securities Litigation and Enforcement”
(2012) 37:3 Brook J Int L 967.
1
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first step in assessing differences and similarities in Canadian
and U.S. insider trading enforcement.
We find, unsurprisingly, that the number of actions is
much larger in the U.S., reflecting its larger economy and the size
of its capital markets. But when we examine the numbers relative
to the amount of trading, the intensity of enforcement in Canada
looks considerably greater, inconsistent with our hypothesis that
the SEC will bring its greater resources to bear in pursuing
insider trading cases. However, Canadian securities regulators
primarily concern themselves with insider trading in Canadian
companies, while the SEC brings more enforcement actions
involving insider trading against foreign incorporated companies
listed in the U.S.
This article contributes to the developing body of
empirical scholarship studying enforcement actions in securities
regulation. Much of the existing literature focuses solely on the
U.S., including studies on: the interaction between public and
private enforcement;3 the role of scandals and other forms of
public pressure on enforcement decisions at the SEC;4 the SEC’s
choice between enforcement in civil court or before an SEC
administrative law judge;5 the incentives of SEC enforcement
attorneys;6 the accuracy of enforcement statistics put forth by the
SEC;7 the role of lead plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys in
shareholder litigation;8 the characteristics of securities class

See Stephen J Choi & A C Pritchard, “SEC Investigations and Securities
Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison” (2016) 13:1 J Empirical Leg Stud
27.
4 See Stephen J Choi, A C Pritchard & Anat Carmy Wiechman, “Scandal
Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations”
(2013) 15:2 Am L & Econ Rev 542.
5 See Stephen J Choi & A C Pritchard, “The SEC’s Shift to Administrative
Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment” (2017) 34:1 Yale J Reg 1.
6 See Ed deHaan, Simi Kedia, Kevin Koh, & Shivaram Rajgopal, “The
Revolving Door and the SEC’s Enforcement Outcomes: Initial Evidence from
Civil Litigation” (2015) 60: 2-3 J Acc & Econ 65.
7 See Urska Velikonja, “Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s
Enforcement Statistics” (2016) 101:4 Cornell Law Review 901.
8 See Stephen J Choi, Jessica Erickson & Adam Pritchard, “Frequent Filers:
Repeat Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation (U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform September 2013); Stephen J Choi, Drew Skinner & A C Pritchard,
“The Price of Pay for Play in Securities Class Actions” (2011) 8:4 J Empirical
Leg Stud 650; Stephen J Choi, “Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class
Actions” (2011) 40:1 Journal of Legal Studies 205; Stephen J Choi & Robert
Thompson, “Securities Litigation and its Lawyers: Changes During the First
Decade After the PSLRA” (2006) 106:7 Colum L Rev 1489.
3
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actions against bankrupt companies;9 the role of auditors in
settlements and securities class actions;10 and the presence of
frivolous lawsuits and the impact of reforms to combat such
lawsuits.11 Missing from this literature, however, is a comparative
analysis of enforcement across borders. This study offers a
unique contribution in this regard, providing original data from
the SEC and provincial securities commissions in Canada.
We proceed as follows. Part 2 provides background on the
regulatory regimes in Canada and the U.S., with specific
reference to insider trading. Part 3 develops our hypotheses. Part
4 presents the results of our empirical tests. Part 5 offers analysis
of the results and concluding thoughts on the policy implications
of differing approaches to securities regulation in Canada and the
U.S.
2. Background
A. Canada

Canada does not have a national securities regulator; in
the U.S., by contrast, the principal securities laws are federally
enacted and enforced by the SEC.12 Securities laws, including
insider trading laws, are enacted and enforced at the provincial
and territorial levels. However, insider trading law is generally
consistent across Canadian provincial and territorial
jurisdictions. The modern justification for insider trading laws in
Canada comes from the 1965 Kimber Report, which asserted that
all investors (insiders and outsiders alike) should be able to
9 See James J Park, “Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies”
(2013) 111:4 Mich L Rev 547.
10 See James J Park, “Auditor Settlements of Securities Class Actions” (2017)
14:1 J Empirical Leg Stud 169.
11 Stephen J Choi & A C Pritchard, “The Supreme Court's Impact on
Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs” (2012) 28:4 J
L, Econ, & Org 850; Stephen J Choi, Karen Nelson & A C Pritchard, “The
Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act” (2009) 6:1 J
Empirical Leg Stud 35; Stephen J Choi, “Do the Merits Matter Less After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act” (2007) 23:3 J L Econ & Org 598;
Marilyn F Johnson, Karen K Nelson & A C Pritchard, “Do the Merits Matter
More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act” (2007)
23:3 J L, Econ & Org 652; Stephen J Choi, Jill E Fisch & A C Pritchard, “Do
Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, (2005) 83:4 Wash ULQ 869; Stephen J
Choi & James Bohn, “Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence
on Securities Class Actions” (1996) 144:3 U Penn L Rev 903.
12 Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837.
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participate in the capital markets on a level playing field and
therefore insider trading should be prohibited.13 Following the
Kimber Report, the Ontario Securities Act of 1966 introduced the
first substantial regulation of insider trading in Canada.14
Unlike the U.S., the basic rules on insider trading in
Canada are set forth in statute.15 Insiders are defined as directors
or officers of the reporting issuer or subsidiaries of the reporting
issuer.16 In addition, any person or company that has a direct or
indirect beneficial ownership of, or control or direction over,
more than 10 per cent of the reporting issuer’s voting securities,
is also an insider.17 Provincial securities commissions also have
broad discretion to designate a person or company as an insider,
if doing so would be in the public interest.18 Insiders may
purchase or sell securities, provided that their trades are not
based on undisclosed (non-public) material information and are
reported within five days from the date of the trade (National
Instrument 55-104). Insider reports are typically filed online
through the “System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders”

The Kimber, chaired by John R Kimber, Q.C., Report of the Attorney
General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s
Printer, 1965) at 10. Case law continues to evidence a commitment to this
concern. For example, in In the Matter of M.C.J.C Holdings Inc. and
Michael Cowpland [2002] 25 OSCB 1133, an OSC panel used its public
interest jurisdiction to reject a settlement with an insider trader because
there was no assurance that the conduct would not occur again and a
concern that the settlement agreement would not sufficiently deter others
from committing insider trading. The lack of deterrence was particularly
important to the panel, as it felt that “illegal insider trading by its very nature
is a cancer that erodes public confidence in the capital markets” and
therefore must be sufficiently punished.
14 David Johnston, Kathleen Rockwell & Cristie Ford, Canadian Securities
Regulation (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at 339.
15 See for example Securities Act (Ontario), RSO ss 107, 76 (1990) [OSA].
16 Directors and officers are defined in such a way so as to include people
who lack the formal title but act in the capacity of a director or officer. See
for example: Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s.1(o), Securities Act, RSBC
1996, c 418, s 1(1); Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 1(1).
17 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 1(aa); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, s
1(1)(“insider); Securities Act, CCSM c S50, s 1(1) (“insider”); Securities Act,
SNB 2004, c S-5.5, s 1(1) (“insider”); Securities Act, RSNL 1990, c S-13, s
2(1)(s); Securities Act, RSNS 1989, c 418, s 2(1)(r); Securities Act, RSO 1990,
c S 5, s 1(1)(“insider”); Securities Act, RSPEI 1988, c S-3.1, s 1(z); Securities
Act, RSQ, c v-1.1, s 89.
18 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, ss 1 (aa) “Insider” (v), 10(1)(c); Securities
Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, ss 1(1) “insider” (e), 3.2(a); Securities Act, RSO 1990,
c S ss 1(1), 1(11).
13
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(SEDI).19
In addition to insiders, provincial securities statutes
regulate the conduct of those in a “special relationship” with the
reporting issuer. The relevant legal provision states that “No
person or company in a special relationship with a reporting
issuer shall purchase or sell securities of the reporting issuer with
the knowledge of a material fact or material change with respect
to the reporting issuer that has not been generally disclosed.”20
The term “special relationship” includes but is not limited to
insiders and covers a wide group of individuals such as: a person
that is an insider, affiliate or associate of a person or company
that is proposing to make a take-over bid of the issuer or enter
into a business combination with the issuer; a person or company
that has engaged in or is proposing to engage in any business or
professional activity on behalf of the issuer; a person or company
that learned of the non-public material information with respect
to the issuer while they were in any of the foregoing positions;
and a person that learns of the non-public material information
from anyone else in a special relationship with the reporting
issuer and knows or ought to reasonably have known that the
other person was in such a special relationship.21
The definition of “special relationship” is at the core of the
prohibition on insider trading.22 Tipping, defined as informing
any other person of a material fact or material change that is not
generally disclosed other than in the necessary course of
business, is also prohibited under the statute.23 With regards to
both illegal insider trading and tipping, the definition of “special
relationship” is of crucial importance as it means that the class of
persons potentially liable for insider trading extends beyond
19 System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders, OSC NI 55-102 – 24 OSCB
6325 and 26 OSCB 3163.
20 OSA, supra note 15 at. § 76(1).
21 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 9; Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, s 3;
Securities Act, CCSM c S50, s 112(1); Securities Act, SNB. 2004, c S-5.5, s
147(1); Securities Act, RSNL 1990, c S-13, s 77(5); Securities Act, RSNS 1989,
c 418, s 82(5); Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 76(5); Securities Act, RSPEI.
1988, c S-3.1, s 12(1); Securities Act, 1988, ss 1988-89, c S-42.2, s 85(1);
Securities Act, SNWT 2008, c 10, s 12(1); Securities Act, S Nu 2008, c 12, s
12(1); Securities Act, S Y 2007, c 16, s 12(1).
22 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 207(1); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c
418, ss 57.2, 136, 136.2; Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 134(1); Securities
Act, RSPEI. 1988, c S-3.1, ss 119(1), 155(1); Securities Act, RSQ, c V-1.1, ss
187, 226; Securities Act, S Nu 2008, c 12, ss 119(1), 155(1); Securities Act,
RSNS 1989, c 418, s 142(1).
23 Ibid. § 76(2).
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those who are defined as “insiders” in the statute.24 For example,
since tippees are themselves considered to be in a special
relationship with an issuer, material information used in a trade
may be third or fourth hand and still be subject to the
prohibition, demonstrating the wide scope of the “special
relationship” definition.25
The test for materiality is codified in statute. A material
fact is defined as “a fact that would reasonably be expected to
have a significant effect on the market price or value of the
securities,”26 while a material change is defined as “a change in
the business, operations or capital of the issuer that would
reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market
price or value of [any of the issuer’s securities].”27 This statutory
test is objective and requires courts to view materiality from the
perspective of the trading markets.28 More recently in Cornish v
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), the OSC affirmed that the
test for materiality is objective and stressed that the test is highly
contextual and therefore void of any “bright line” rules.29
For disclosure, courts have interpreted this requirement
as requiring wide dissemination “in a manner calculated to
effectively reach the marketplace” and in such a way so as to give
“public investors [a] reasonable amount of time to analyze the
information.”30 Unlike the materiality requirement, there have
not been many recent cases clarifying what constitutes a
reasonable time for the purposes of dissemination. A leading case
remains Re Harold P. Conner, where the OSC developed a twopronged test for determining when information is generally
disclosed: the information was generally disseminated to the
public; and, the public was given sufficient time to consider the
information given its nature and complexity.31 There is no firm
Ibid. § 76(5).
Disclosure Standards, OSC, NP 51-201 (12 July 2002), online:
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/SecuritiesCategory5/pol_20020712_51-201.pdf> at s 3.2(2), (3).
26 Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 1(1) (“material fact”).
27 Ibid., (“material change”).
28 YBM Magnex International Inc., Re, [2003] 26 OSCB 5285 at para 91,
2003 CarswellOnt 2632.
29 Cornish v Ontario (Securities Commission) 2013 ONSC 1310 at para 5153, 227 ACWS (3d) 276. See also Rex Diamond Mining Corp v Ontario
(Securities Commission), 2010 ONSC 3926, 191 ACWS (3d) 998; Donald, Re
[2013], 2013 CarswellOnt 936, 26 OSCB 1449; Kapusta, Re [2011] ABASC
322.
30 NP 51-201, supra note 25 , s 3.5(2).
31 In the Matter of Harold P Conner et al, [1976] OSCB 149 at 174.
24
25
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rule as to when this will occur, since what is a reasonable time for
investors to analyze the information depends on a number of
factors such as the nature and complexity of the information, the
nature of the market in which the securities are being traded, and
the manner in which the information is released.32
There are various defenses to insider trading. These
include acting without using the information,33 no knowledge of
the material information,34 disclosure of a material fact or
material change in the necessary course of business before it has
been generally disclosed,35 and reasonably believing that the
undisclosed material fact or change had been generally disclosed
prior to the impugned trade or that the other party to the
transaction had knowledge of the undisclosed material
information.36 In addition, insiders can enter into automatic
securities disposition plans whereby the insider can delegate
selling authority to a broker. As long as the plan eliminates the
insider’s discretion over sales made pursuant to the plan, the

NP 51-201, supra note 25.
Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 147(5)(b); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c
418, s 57.4(4); Securities Act, CQLR, c V-1.1, ss 187(2)-(3).
34 Guidelines for Policies and Procedures Concerning Inside Information,
OSC NP 33-601 (1998).
35 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 147(4); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418,
s 57.2(3); Securities Act, CCSM c S 50, 112(3); Securities Act, SNB 2004, c S5.5, s 147(4); Securities Act, RSNL 1990, c S-13, s 77(2); Securities Act, RSNS
1989, c 418, s 82(2); Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S 5, s 76(2); Securities Act,
RSPEI 1988, c S-3.1, s 155(2); Securities Act, 1988, S S 1988-89, c S-42.2, s
85(4).
36 OSA, supra note 15 at § 76(4); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, s 57.4(1);
Securities Act, RSQ, c V-1.1, s 187; Securities Act, 1988, S S 1988-89, c S42.2, s 85(6); Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 147(6); Securities Act, S Y
2007, c 16, s 156(1); Securities Act, S Nu. 2008, c 12, s 156(1); General
Securities Rules, N S Reg 201/87, s 181(5). A claim of honest but
unreasonable belief is not a sufficient defense. In Gorrie, Re, 2006 ABASC
1087, at paras 5, 15-17, ASCD No 115, the Alberta Securities Commission
accepted that the accused had a genuine belief that the information he
obtained from a CEO had been generally disclosed at a recently held board
meeting. Nevertheless, the commission held that the accused should have
known the discussions were confidential and that he had a responsibility to
confirm that this information had been generally disclosed before trading.
Similarly, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Finkelstein v Ontario
(Securities Commission), 2016 ONSC 7508 at para 116-117,274 ACWS (3d)
656 recently affirmed that a number of objective contextual factors should be
used to determine whether or not a person who receives material non-public
information ought to have known that the source of the information was
someone in a special relationship with the reporting issuer, regardless of
their subjective belief.
32
33
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insider will have a defense to allegations of insider trading.37
In terms of penalties for insider trading, securities
commission staff can choose to bring a quasi-criminal action
which, if a conviction is obtained, could result in jail time of
maximum five years less a day or a fine or both. In this case, the
fine is equal to the greater of $5 million, or the amount equal to
triple the amount of the profit made or the loss avoided by the
person or company by reason of the contravention. Alternatively,
securities commission staff can bring an administrative action
where the maximum fine is one million dollars per offence.38
Other sanctions can be layered on top of this penalty in the case
of an individual, including bans from trading or from serving as
a director or officer of a public company.39
B. United States

Unlike Canadian law, the offense of insider trading in the
U.S. is based nominally on the prohibition against fraud found in
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act,40 but it is closer to the
truth to call it a species of common law.41 Beginning in the 1960s,
the SEC pushed the courts to recognize insider trading as fraud.42
The agency enjoyed considerable success with its agenda in the
lower courts, most notably the Second Circuit, the leading
intermediate court for securities law.43 The government got
pushback, however, when the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
expanded the prohibition to include criminal enforcement,
which brought the topic of insider trading to the attention of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Beginning with Chiarella v
United States,44 the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of
37 Automatic Securities Disposition Plans and Automatic Securities Purchase Plans, OSC
Staff Notice 55-701.
38 See, e.g., Section 122 OSA, supra note 35.
39 See, e.g., Section 127 OSA, supra note 35.
40 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 [Securities Exchange Act].
41 There is a “short swing” profits provision for trades by statutory insiders under § 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, but it has limited reach. Although it is a strict liability provision,
it only applies to purchases and sales (or sales and then purchases) made within six months
of each other. As such, it is both under- and over-inclusive, and more to the point, readily
avoided by timing transactions. Rule 10b-5, which is tied to the insider’s knowledge, is the
more significant insider trading prohibition.
42 The beginning of the SEC’s modern campaign against insider trading is
usually traced to an administrative proceeding against a broker-dealer,
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
43 See, e.g., SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F 2d 833 (1968) (recognizing
parity of information theory of insider trading under Rule 10b-5).
44 445 US 222 (1980).
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insider trading under Rule 10b-5. The law of insider trading as it
stands now in the U.S. incorporates two principal theories:
1) the classical theory, first recognized by the Supreme Court
in Chiarella, which holds that a corporate insider (or
temporary insider, such as a lawyer or an accountant)
commits fraud when he trades with a shareholder without
disclosing material, non-public information to that
shareholder; and
2) the misappropriation theory, which holds that a person
who has received material, non-public information is subject
to a duty of trust and confidence, and commits fraud when he
trades on the basis of that information without disclosing his
intention to trade to the source of the information.45
A slightly broader prohibition applies to insider trading in
connection with tender offers; under Rule 14e-3 of the Exchange
Act, the government is not required to prove a breach of fiduciary
duty in such cases.46 U.S. insider trading doctrine also includes a
prohibition against tipping; tippees are barred from trading if
they know or should know that they have received information
from an insider who received a personal benefit from disclosing
the information (such as cash, or an indirect benefit by making a
gift of the information to a relative or friend).47 Tippers are
jointly and severally liable with their tippees.
The common law character of the U.S. insider trading
prohibition leads to a variety of gray areas around the edges of
the rule. The SEC has resisted a statutory codification, worrying
that a statute would create a “road-map to fraud” if not written
expansively enough.48 Congress has generally acquiesced in the
SEC’s reluctance to reduce the insider trading prohibition to
statute. Instead, the legislature has intervened only to correct
particular problems with insider trading law, such as creating a
private right of action for contemporaneous traders.49 This
provision is seldom used; considerably more common are
United States v O’Hagan, 521 US 642 (1997).
17 CFR § 240.14e-3.
47 Salman v United States, 137 S Ct 420 (2016).
48 A C Pritchard, “The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?”, online: (2005) 80:3
Notre Dame L Rev 1086.
<repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1508&context=articl
es>; Carmen Germaine, “Rakoff Urges Securities Bar to Write Insider
Trading Law”, Law 360 (1 March 2017), online:
<https://www.law360.com/articles/897188/rakoff-urges-securities-bar-towrite-insider-trading-law>.
49 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 40, § 20A.
45

46
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securities fraud class actions in which insider trading by
corporate executives is alleged as a motive for misstatements.
Congress has also stepped in to correct obvious gaps in the
insider trading prohibition developed by the SEC and the courts,
such as trading in options.50 Most recently, Congress was shamed
into adopting a prohibition against its own members and staff
trading on non-public information.51 The SEC has been similarly
circumspect in its rulemaking efforts; other than Rule 14e-3,
noted above, the SEC has adopted rules only when necessary to
clarify issues that had created serious enforcement problems for
the agency.52 One of these rules, Rule 10b5-1, also creates a
defense for transactions effected through a trading plan.
The U.S. insider trading regime allows for a wide range of
penalties, with monetary penalties most commonly imposed. The
Exchange Act allows the SEC to sue the offender for a penalty of
up to three times the profit gained or the loss avoided.53 This
special penalty for insider trading is in addition to other
sanctions available for fraud, including bars from serving as an
officer or director of a public company,54 as an investment
advisor,55 or as an affiliate of a broker-dealer.56 Criminal
prosecution is also available.57
Insider trading is an enforcement priority for the SEC, as
well as for the DOJ on the criminal side.58 (Most criminal cases
originate from a referral by the SEC to the DOJ.) The SEC is aided
in its enforcement efforts by the surveillance efforts of the selfregulatory organizations, most importantly, the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”), and Nasdaq. Both the SEC and the DOJ
publicize their insider trading efforts, scheduling press
conferences to announce the bringing of charges, as well as press
releases when the government obtains settlements or wins a
Ibid., 20(d) (prohibiting trading in options based on material, non-public
information if trading in the underlying security would be a violation).
51 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act, Pub L No 112105, 126 Stat 291 (April 4, 2012).
52 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 40, Rule 10b5-1 (defining trading “on
the basis of” material, non-public information); 10b5-2 (defining duties of
trust and confidence for purposes of the misappropriation theory).
53 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 40, § 21A(a)(2).
54 Ibid., § 21(d)(2).
55 Investment Advisers Act § 203(f).
56 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 40, § 15(b)(6).
57 Ibid., § 32.
58 See A C Pritchard, “Insider Trading and the Ambiguous Quest for Edge”
(2018) 116:6 Mich L Rev 945.
50
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verdict at trial. The SEC also features insider trading cases
prominently when it reports annually to Congress.59 State
securities regulators, by contrast, play only a peripheral role in
enforcing prohibitions against insider trading.60
C. Comparing the Two Jurisdictions
In this section, we highlight some of the key differences
between securities regulators in Canada and the U.S. The section
starts with a discussion of prior comparative work on insider
trading in the two jurisdictions. We then compare the public
company landscape of both jurisdictions as it stands today. Next,
we examine the number of insider trading matters brought by the
SEC and Canadian regulators as a proportion of the regulators’
overall portfolio of enforcement actions. Lastly, we discuss the
resources available to the Canadian regulators and the SEC, and
conclude the section by comparing penalties imposed by
Canadian regulators and the U.S. SEC.
A detailed empirical analysis of insider trading cases
conducted by Utpal Bhattacharya highlights two important
differences between U.S. and Canadian regulators with respect to
penalties. First, he found that when scaled for the respective size
of the different stock markets, U.S. authorities prosecute 20
times more insider trading violations than their Canadian
counterparts.61 Second, he shows that, in comparison to the OSC,
the fines administered by the SEC in the U.S. are higher per
insider trading case by a factor of 17. 62 More specifically,
Bhattacharya’s analysis of the enforcement actions of the OSC for
the 1997-2000 period, when scaled by the number of listed firms
in the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange, shows that the total
amount of fines imposed for insider trading cases was
US$700,000.63 On a per case basis, this value amounts to
See, e.g., SEC, Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2016, at 16-17, 155.
One (minor) exception is the former New York Attorney General, who has
made some effort to discourage trading on non-public information with the
potential for market impact. See Press Release, “Att’y Gen. of N.Y. State, A.G.
Schneiderman Secures Agreement By Thomson Reuters To Stop Offering
Early Access To Market-Moving Information” (8 July 2013), online:
<http://www.ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/ag-schneiderman-securesagreementthomson-reuters-stop-offering-early-accessmarket>.
61 Utpal Bhattacharya, “Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and
Liquidity of the Market (2006), Canada Steps Up: The Report of the Task
Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada (Toronto, 2006), online:
<citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.522.2315&rep=rep1&ty
pe=pdf>.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
59

60
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US$70,300. In comparison, for the 1997-2000 period, the fines
imposed by the SEC for insider trading cases amounted to
US$411,890,000.64 On a per case basis, this value amounts to
US$1,201,000 per case.
Today, the composition of the Canadian capital market
continues to differ from that of the U.S. in terms of size and
number of the public companies. One important feature of the
Canadian capital markets landscape is that it hosts a large
number of public companies, yet its total market capitalization is
not very large.65 In other words, there is a large number of very
small companies. Moreover, in Canada, there is a relatively small
number of very large issuers; when ranked by market
capitalization, the largest 100 companies on the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX) make up 70% of all TSX-listed companies.66 In
comparison, while there are 60 major stock exchanges
throughout the world, the NYSE itself is bigger than the world's
50 smallest major exchanges and represents about 27% of the
total market for global equities.67
Second, insider trading matters make up a higher
proportion of the SEC’s portfolio of enforcement cases when
compared to those of Canadian regulators. In Canada, in 2016,
illegal insider trading matters made up 8.3% (12 of 144) of the
enforcement proceedings that were commenced, and 6.5% (17 of
262) of the enforcement files that were closed.68 In 2015, insider
trading matters made up 5.2% (14 of 266) of the enforcement
proceedings that were commenced, and 8% (28 of 350) of the
enforcement files that were closed.69 In comparison, in 2016, in
the U.S., cases involving trading on the basis of inside
information made up 9% (78 of 868) of the cases filed by the
SEC.70 In 2015, there were 87 parties charged with insider

Ibid.
Puri, supra note 2.
66 Ibid.
67 Jeff Desjardins, “All of the World’s Stock Exchanges by Size”, (2016)
online: <money.visualcapitalist.com/all-of-the-worlds-stock-exchanges-bysize/>.
68 See CSA, “CSA 2016 Enforcement Report” (2016) online:
<www.csasanctions.ca/CSA_AnnualReport2016_English_Final.pdf>.
69 Ibid.
70 See SEC Press Release, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY
2016” (11 October 2016) online:
<https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html>.
64
65
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trading, making insider trading 10.8% of SEC’s overall portfolio
of 807 enforcement actions for the year. 71
Although Canada’s provincial structure of market
oversight makes it challenging to estimate the total budget for
securities market oversight, previous studies highlight the
differences between the Canadian and the U.S. regulatory
systems in terms of their budgets and staffing levels. Several
studies show that, when adjusted for deflators such as market
size, population and GDP, the levels of Canadian securities
regulatory staffing and budget are actually slightly more
intensive in comparison to the U.S.72 For example, the 2014
annual report by the Financial Services Authority of the United
Kingdom (FSA Report) suggests that, once normalized for equity
market size, the supervisory budget of the Canadian securities
regulation is more intensive than that of the U.S.73 More
specifically, while the FSA Report estimates Canadian securities
regulation budget per billion dollars of market cap at
US$220,515, the U.S. budget was estimated at US$83,943. 74 In
a more recent study, Howell Jackson attempts to normalize the
data by considering other factors, such as population and GDP.
He finds that although the U.S. regulators, which include state
regulators in addition to the SEC, have a regulatory budget and
staffing that is 5 to 9 times larger than Canada, the U.S. market
is also 10 times larger.75 In other words, although the U.S.
securities regulators are spending more per staff member than
their Canadian counterparts,76 they also have a market that is
larger by a greater factor. As Jackson suggests, this implies that
when normalized for population, GDP, or market capitalization,
Canadian regulatory budgets and staffing are more intense than
that of the U.S.77
In addition, Canadian and U.S. regulatory budgets also
differ with respect to the proportion of resources allocated to
enforcement activities, with Canadian regulators spending a
See SEC Press Release, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015”
(22 October 2015) online: <https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015245.html>.
72 See Howell E Jackson, “Regulatory Intensity in the Regulation of Capital
Markets: A Preliminary Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Approaches”
(2006), Canada Steps Up: The Report of the Task Force to Modernize
Securities Legislation in Canada (Toronto, 2006), at 81.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, at 97.
76 Ibid, at 94.
77 Ibid, at 97.
71
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lower proportion of their regulatory budget on enforcement than
the SEC. In 2016, the SEC had a total budget of US$1.9 billion, of
which US$1.7 billion was allocated to facilitating its programs. 78
Of the $1.7 billion of this budget, 35% (US$595 million) was
allocated to programs led by the Enforcement Division.79 In
comparison, Canadian regulators allocate a lower proportion of
their budget to enforcement activities. Although the portion of
the regulatory budget allocated to enforcement is not generally
disclosed by provincial regulators, previous studies show that, in
general, securities commissions spend between 10% to 20% of
their total budgets on enforcement.80 A study conducted by
Charles River Associates shows that, in 2002, the OSC allocated
over CAD$9 million of its budget to enforcement activities, while
Quebec, B.C., and Alberta spent $4.4, $3.5, and $3.1 million
respectively.81
In conclusion, Canada and the U.S. differ in terms of their
capital market and regulatory landscape. First, insider trading
matters make up a higher proportion of the SEC’s portfolio of
enforcement cases when compared to those of Canadian
regulators. Second, in comparison to the U.S. regulators,
Canadian securities regulators have slightly more intensive
staffing and budgets, but they allocate a smaller portion of their
budget to enforcement activities. However, it is important not to
draw the premature conclusion that these differences are a result
of a different propensity for enforcing capital market rules in the
two jurisdictions.82 As suggested by Puri, structural inefficiencies
or unique regulatory priorities (i.e., prioritizing compliance over
enforcement) and challenges could be the factors that result in
differences in enforcement activity.83 In the next section, we
introduce our eight hypotheses that focus on the differences in
insider trading enforcement actions in Canada and the U.S.

78 See table in the SEC, “US SEC Summary of Performance and Financial
Information FY2016 report” (2017) online:
<https://www.sec.gov/files/2017-03/sec-summary-of-performance-andfinancial-info-fy2016.pdf>, at 15.
79 Ibid at 15-16.
80 See Poonam Puri, “Enforcement Effectiveness in the Canadian Capital
Markets” (2005) Commissioned Reports and Studies. Paper 3, online:
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002
&context=reports>. See also Charles River Associates, “Securities
Enforcement in Canada: The Effect of Multiple Regulators, study prepared
for the Wise Persons’ Committee” (December 2003).
81 Ibid.
82 Puri, supra note 2.
83 Ibid.
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3. Hypotheses
One may assume that the SEC has greater resources, more
economies of scale, and more expertise in bringing insider
trading actions.84 More importantly, the greater trading volume
of the U.S. capital markets suggests that the total incidence of
insider trading will be significantly greater in the U.S. (greater
trading volume makes it easier to conceal informed trades from
other traders; it is difficult to conceal informed trading in small
cap companies). These factors suggest that the SEC will bring
more insider trading actions than its Canadian counterparts. It is
possible that Canadian regulators will be able to bring relatively
more insider trading actions to the extent the Canadian actions
involve more straightforward fact patterns. This effect is unlikely
to outweigh, however, the greater size of the U.S. capital markets.
Hypothesis 1: The U.S. will have more insider trading
actions than Canada, both in absolute numbers and as
scaled by the market capitalization of publicly traded
firms in both markets.
The more cosmopolitan nature of the U.S. capital markets
leads us to our next hypothesis. The number of cross-listed firms
is substantially greater on U.S. exchanges than on Canadian
For reference, in 2015 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission spent
$1.586 billion on enforcement activities while Ontario, British Columbia,
Alberta, New Brunswick and Manitoba spent $98.870 million, $47.7 million,
$38.495 million, $9.9 million, and $5.036 million, respectively, on
enforcement activities. For a full examination of budget and personnel
differences see: SEC, “FY 2017 Congressional Budget Justification; FY 2017
Annual Performance Plan; FY 2015 Annual Performance Report” (9
February 2016), online: <https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/budgetreports/about-reports-secfy17congbudgjustshtml.html>; Ontario Securities
Commission, Annual Report 2015, (8 June 2015), online:
<www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Publications/Publications_rpt_2015_o
sc-annual-rpt_en.pdf>; British Columbia Securities Commission,
2015/2016-2017/2018 (2016), online:
<www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2016/sp/pdf/agency/bcsc.pdf>; Alberta
Securities Commission, 2015 Annual Report (2015), online:
<www.albertasecurities.com/Publications/2015_ASCAnnual_Report_Web.pdf>; Financial and Consumer Services Commission,
“2015-2016 Annual Report” (2016) online:
<http://0104.nccdn.net/1_5/1c7/37a/1bc/Annual-Report-2015-2016.pdf>;
Manitoba Securities Commission, “Pride, Protection, Purpose: Manitoba
Financial Services Agency 2016 Annual Report” (2016), online:
<http://www.mbsecurities.ca/about-msc/pubs/2016_ar.pdf>.
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exchanges.85 Although insider trading enforcement may be
primarily intended to promote market integrity, it arguably
promotes corporate governance improvements as well. Those
benefits might accrue primarily in the jurisdiction where the
foreign company is headquartered. The SEC is more likely to
score points with Congress for “renting” the U.S.’s reputation for
quality corporate governance to foreign companies than
Canada’s provinicial regulators are with their respective
legislatures. Consequently, Canadian securities regulators are
more likely to focus on insider trading actions involving insiders
of Canadian companies that are not cross-listed. In addition, the
SEC’s greater resources give it a greater ability to pursue insider
trading actions involving foreign companies, which pose a
greater challenge for regulators when collecting evidence.
Hypothesis 2: The U.S. will bring more insider trading
actions involving foreign public companies as a
fraction of all insider trading actions.
Our next hypothesis relates to case complexity. We
postulate that Canadian regulators will tend to avoid actions
involving multiple companies. Actions involving insider trading
conspiracies, in which information about different companies is
shared among the conspirators, frequently involve investment
professionals trading in multiple firms. (Financial institutions
afford more trading opportunities, but they also face stringent
compliance regimes, which may require cooperation with others
in an effort to avoid detection.) These cases are likely to be more
complicated, and consequently, will take greater resources to
establish the connections among the co-conspirators.
An implicit assumption of this hypothesis is that the
number of underlying insider trading violations involving
multiple companies for Canada and the U.S. is similar once
scaled by the size of the economy. Any differences in the
85 Currently, there are about 491 non-U.S. issuers on the NYSE and 108 nonU.S. issuers on the NASDAQ. In comparison, there are 236 non-Canadian
companies on the TSX and TSXV. Of those international companies, 121
(51%) are American companies. For more see Toronto Stock Exchange,
“Guide to Listing” (2017), online:<https://www.tsx.com/resource/en/181>;
New York Stock Exchange, “International Listings: Documents and Reports”
(30 June 2017) online: <https://www.nyse.com/getstarted/international/documents-reports> [NYSE]; NASDAQ, “NASDAQ –
Non-U.S. Companies” (2017), online:
<http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-byindustry.aspx?exchange=NASDAQ&market=ADR>.
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incidence of multiple company enforcement are therefore due to
differences in how regulators in each country deal with multiple
company insider trading violations. Although we cannot test this
assumption explicitly, we do note that most conspiracies
involving insider trading at multiple companies involve
individuals associated with financial institutions. As a
percentage of the total economy, Canada’s financial sector is
comparable to that of the U.S.,86 consistent with the assumption
of a roughly equivalent number of underlying insider trading
violations involving multiple companies scaled by economy size.
Hypothesis 3: U.S. actions will involve more actions
involving multiple traded companies as a fraction of all
insider trading actions.
Continuing with the theme of case complexity, we predict
that the number of defendants for each action will be greater in
the U.S. than in Canada. Greater resources allow the SEC to
prosecute more complicated networks and more readily track
down all of the potential co-conspirators. In addition, targeting
tippers or tippees will require unraveling more complicated fact
patterns, as will pursuing top insiders at a public company, who
may also have greater resources to defend against an
enforcement action. As discussed above, Canada and the U.S.
differ in their respective legal regimes governing tipper-tippees.
On the one hand, the U.S. regime is primarily common law based,
requiring a breach of fiduciary duty, leading to greater
uncertainty of interpretation for regulators bringing tippertippee actions. On the other hand, the legal requirements in
Canada, where a “special relationship” and the transmission of a
material fact or material change must be demonstrated for
tipper-tippee liability, are challenging to prove and may require
more expenditure to prosecute. As a result, differences in tipper
or tippee enforcement actions between Canada and the U.S.
could also be due to the varying costs of enforcement in the two
countries.
Hypothesis 4: U.S. actions will have more defendants.
Hypothesis 5: U.S. actions will be more likely to include
tippers or tippees and top insider defendants.

Jeff Desjardins, “A Tale of Two Banking Sectors: Canada vs U.S.” (16 May
2018), online (blog): Visual Capitalist,
<http://www.visualcapitalist.com/canada-u-s-banking-differences/>.
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The SEC is familiar with criminal process, frequently
cooperating with the DOJ in bringing securities fraud cases. In
addition, the U.S. DOJ has a long-established track record
prosecuting financial market crimes. In contrast, Canada has less
experience pursuing insider trading in criminal proceedings.
This inexperience may, in part, reflect the constitutional division
of powers between the federal government and the provinces. In
addition, Canadian investigation and prosecution of criminal
actions is diffused among federal and provincial bodies, making
parallel criminal actions more complicated.87 Thus, the outcome
of criminal prosecution is likely to be more uncertain, while also
requiring a high level of enforcement resources. Accordingly, we
predict, given equally egregious facts, the SEC will be more likely
to make a referral resulting in criminal enforcement than
Canadian regulators.
Hypothesis 6: U.S. actions will be more likely to
generate a criminal referral.
Our next hypothesis relates to predictability.
Predictability may lead to a greater probability of settlement
because both the government and the defendant will be better
able to forecast the likely outcome from adjudication. On the one
hand, the U.S.’s greater experience with insider trading actions
and larger stock of precedents makes enforcement more
predictable. On the other hand, Canadian law more clearly sets
forth the elements of the offense in statutes, avoiding some of the
uncertainty generated by the U.S.’s largely common law
approach to insider trading.
Predictability is not the entire story, however, when it
comes to settlement rates. Resources also matter: the greater the
resources available for the government, the less likely defendants
will be to take their chances with adjudication. The SEC has more
enforcement actions to manage than its Canadian counterparts,
but its greater capacity allows it to bring more resources to bear
87 For more on the difficulties in pursuing criminal prosecutions for capital
markets offenses in Canada, see Poonam Puri, “Enforcement Effectiveness in
the Canadian Capital Markets” (2005) Commissioned Reports and Studies.
Paper 3. online:
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002
&context=reports>; and Poonam Puri, “A Model for Common Enforcement
in Canada: The Canadian Capital Markets Enforcement Agency and the
Canadian Securities Hearing Tribunal” (2008) Commissioned Reports and
Studies. Paper 111, online:
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1110
&context=reports>.
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if defendants choose to resist. Given the uncertainty over which
regime provides greater predictability, we postulate that the
“resource effect” dominates and that the settlement rate will be
greater in the U.S.
Hypothesis 7: U.S. enforcement actions will be more
likely to produce a settlement.
Like hypothesis 7, our final hypothesis also relates to
outcomes: what sanctions are imposed as a result of the insider
trading enforcement action? Both countries make available a
range of sanctions for those punished for insider trading,
including disgorgement of unlawful gains (or losses avoided),
prejudgment interest on those gains, monetary penalties, and
bars. Bars may preclude an individual from serving as an officer
or director of a public company, or may limit the ability of an
individual to serve in the financial industry as a registered
representative of a broker-dealer or investment adviser.
We postulate that, consistent with Canada’s pursuit of
more straightforward insider trading actions, insider trading
actions will result in lower monetary sanctions because trading
profits may not be as great if enforcement does not target
complicated conspiracies. We posit that trading profits are
higher for more complicated insider trading actions involving
multiple companies and defendants. Because of the lower
monetary sanctions available, Canada will rely more on bars to
adjust behavior. In the event that a bar is imposed in both
countries, however, the U.S. is more likely to make the bar
permanent. This reflects the SEC’s greater resources, which it
may be willing to commit to exclude the most egregious offenders
from positions that would allow them to repeat their illegal
behavior. By contrast, Canadian regulators may be more likely to
use their administrative power as a first line of enforcement; if
those bars prove ineffective, subsequent actions and the
sanctions levied may be more draconian.
Hypothesis 8A: The U.S. will impose greater penalties,
especially disgorgement and monetary penalties.
Hypothesis 8B: Canada will be more likely to impose
temporary bars, while the U.S. will be more likely to
impose a permanent bar.
4.

Empirical Results
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A.

Sample

To collect our sample, we identified all insider trading
enforcement actions brought by the securities commissions in
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Québec
from 2005 to 2015. (Our research did not uncover any insider
trading cases brought by the regulatory authorities in the other
Canadian provincial and territorial jurisdictions.) Using
enforcement releases issued by the SEC, we also collected insider
trading actions brought by that agency for the same period. For
each of the actions, we identified the defendant(s) and their
relationship to the traded company(ies). We also coded a number
of features of the actions, including the filing and resolution
dates, the outcomes of the cases and any sanctions imposed, and
whether there were criminal referrals leading to prosecution.
(We did not treat the criminal cases as separate observations.)
Table 1 below shows the number of actions brought in each
country broken down by the year initiated.
Table 1: Insider Trading Enforcement Actions in Canada and
the U.S.
Year

CA

US

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

4
7
4
6
13
11
10
3
6
2
7
73

39
41
38
38
38
35
46
55
41
51
32
454

CA-US Percent of
Combined Actions
9.3%
90.7%
14.6%
85.4%
9.5%
90.5%
13.6%
86.4%
25.5%
74.5%
23.9%
76.1%
17.9%
82.1%
5.2%
94.8%
12.8%
87.2%
3.8%
96.2%
17.9%
82.1%
13.9%
86.1%

Unsurprisingly, the number of actions is much larger in
the U.S., reflecting its larger economy and deeper capital
markets. The overall ratio of U.S. actions to Canadian actions is
6.2 to 1, consistent with Hypothesis 1.88 If we look at that number
88 Although the number of actions is lower in Canada than the United States,
it is possible that the number of defendants per action may be higher in
Canada. To address this possibility, we computed the aggregate number of
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relative to the amount of trading, however, the intensity of
enforcement in Canada looks considerably greater. According to
the World Bank, the value of shares traded in Canada was $1,096
billion U.S. in 2015, while in the U.S., the corresponding number
was $41,398 billion U.S. for the same year.89 The ratio of trading
in the U.S. relative to Canada is 37.8 to 1. Adjusting for trading
volume, Canada would appear to have a considerably greater
intensity of enforcement when compared to the U.S.,
inconsistent with Hypothesis 1.90
Of note, consistent with the research of Anand and Green,
we found that the number of Canadian actions spiked in the wake
of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, whereas the U.S.
numbers stayed relatively steady.91 Of course, these ratios offer
only a crude comparison because they omit the actual incidence
of insider trading, a data point that is unavailable given the
clandestine nature of the conduct. These raw numbers also do
not control for the type of insider trading; it is possible that U.S.
enforcement actions tackle more complicated insider trading
conspiracies, which would require greater enforcement
resources. Consistent with this conjecture, the number of
enforcement actions in the U.S. appears to be greater in the
second half of our sample period, when the Federal Bureau of
Investigation began using wire taps to target insider trading
among hedge funds.

defendants for all actions in Canada (127) and the United States (2,138). The
ratio of the number of U.S. defendants to Canadian defendants is 16.8 to 1,
consistent with Hypothesis 1.
89 World Bank, “Indicators” (2018), online:
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD>.
90 We also compared the number of listed domestic companies (including
foreign companies which are exclusively listed) as tracked by the World
Bank for Canada and the United States in 2015. See World Bank,
“Indicators” (2018), online:
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO>. The ratio of
listed domestic companies in the United States (4,381 listed companies) to
Canada (3,799 listed companies) is only 1.1. The large number of listed
listed companies in Canada relative to the size of its economy reflects a high
percentage of small market capitalization firms with relatively low trading
volume. To the extent trading volume better approximates the
opportunities for an insider to take advantage of their inside information,
we think that the comparison of trading volume between the U.S. and
Canada is a better metric for the relative sizes of the capital markets of the
two countries than the number of listed companies.
91 Anita Anand & Andrew Green, “Securities Settlements as an Example of
Crisis-driven Regulation” (2018) 55 Int Rev L & Econ 41.
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We also applied the Standard Industry Classification
(SIC) one-digit industry code to the traded companies in the
actions and grouped them into seven categories, as reported in
Table 2. For the actions with multiple traded companies, we
coded each traded company separately. Table 2 compares the
frequency of insider trading actions in the seven industry
groupings for the two countries.
Table 2: SIC One-Digit Industry Classification for Traded
Companies

Industry Classification

CA

Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing (SIC 0)
Mining & Construction (SIC 1)
Manufacturing (SIC 2 and 3)
Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas
and Sanitary service (SIC 4)

1

Percent
of Total
for CA
1.4%

40
11
2

Wholesale & Retail Trade (SIC
5)
Finance, Insurance and Real
Estate (SIC 6)
Services (SIC 7 and 8)
Total

1

Percent
of Total
for US
0.1%

55.6%
15.3%
2.8%

22
401
41

2.7%
48.7%
5.0%

3

4.2%

93

11.3%

12

16.7%

99

12.0%

3
72

4.2%
100.0%

167
824

20.3%
100.0%

US

Chi2(2) = 302.7; Prob. = 0.000.

The striking number from the table is the large proportion
of firms in the mining and construction industries on the
Canadian side. This is unsurprising given that mining issuers
dominate the Canadian stock exchanges, representing almost
one half of the total issuers on the TSX Venture Exchange.92 The
natural resources sector is also very important to the overall
Canadian economy, and it may be that the nature of this cyclical
business, with its potential for dramatic variances in underlying
commodity prices and boom/bust results, creates an added
incentive for insider trading. Additionally, regulatory discretion
92 Poonam Puri, “The Role of Local and Regional Interests in the Design of
Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure for Canada” (2003), online:
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/reports/118/>. See also TMX,
“S&P/TSX Venture Composite Index” (2018), online: <
https://web.tmxmoney.com/index_sector.php?qm_symbol=%5EJX>.
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may lead to a greater emphasis on insider trading cases in the
natural resources sector.93
B. Empirical Tests
Hypothesis 2 postulates that the U.S. may be more
inclined to use its enforcement resources to investigate trading
in companies incorporated outside the U.S. For actions with a
single traded company, we determined the country of
incorporation for the traded company. For the actions with
multiple traded companies, we coded the country of
incorporation for each traded company separately. We report the
country of incorporation for the Canadian and U.S. insider
trading actions in our dataset in Table 3.
Table 3: Country of Incorporation
Country of
Canadian
Incorporation Actions

US
Actions
26

Percent
of all US
Actions
3.2%

Canada

57

Percent
of all CA
Actions
93.4%

US
Other

3

4.9%

737

91.8%

1

1.6%

40

5.0%

Total

61

100.0%

803

100.0%

Chi2(2) = 531.5; Prob. = 0.000.

As reported in Table 3, Canadian securities regulators
primarily concern themselves with insider trading in Canadian
companies, while the SEC brings more insider trading
enforcement actions against companies incorporated outside the
93 The largest number of firms in Table 2 is in the Manufacturing (SIC 2 and
3) category. In the following table we report the breakdown for those threedigit SIC categories within the Manufacturing category where there are more
than ten firms from either the United States and Canada in the three-digit
category.
SIC
CA
US

283 (Drugs)

2

127

357 (Computer and Office Equipment)

2

39

366 (Communications Equipment)

0

30

367 (Electronic Components and Accessories)
384 (Surgical, Medical, and Dental
Instruments and Supplies)

1

54

0

36
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U.S. (and outside of Canada). This broader focus presumably
reflects the greater incidence of cross-listing in the U.S.,94
making it likely that the trading was done on a U.S. exchange,
even if the company’s headquarters and operations are located
elsewhere.
We next examine the complexity of the cases investigated.
Hypothesis 3 posits that the SEC, with its greater resources, will
be more inclined to take on complicated insider trading rings.
This may manifest itself in investigations involving multiple
traded companies, as insider trading conspirators exchange
information in various companies. Table 4 compares the
likelihood that an insider trading enforcement action involves
multiple companies.
Table 4: Multiple Company Actions
Multiple Companies
+

CA
US
t-test
21.9% 20.5% 0.257

p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, we do not find significant
differences in the fraction of actions involving multiple traded
companies between Canada and the U.S. Investigations involving
multiple companies constitute 20.5% of the actions in the U.S.
and 21.9% of the actions in Canada.

NYSE, supra note 85. The NYSE, America’s largest stock exchange by
market capitalization, had 451 non-U.S. issuers in 2006, 422 in 2007, 412 in
2008, 496 in 2009, 519 in 2010, 521 in 2011, 525 in 2012, 520 in 2013, 528
in 2014, 515 in 2015, and 487 in 2016. Currently there are 491 non-U.S.
issuers on the NYSE. In contrast, the TMX group (which operates the TSX
and TSXV, by far the largest stock exchanges in Canada) has fluctuated
between 205 non-Canadian issuers in 2006 to 236 international issuers
today. For more see, TSX Group, Annual Reports 2006 through 2017. When
combining the NYSE with other major American stock exchanges, such as
the Nasdaq and AMEX, the gap between rates of cross-listing between the
two jurisdictions grow even larger. Specifically, there are approximately 724
foreign issuers on the three largest American stock exchanges. See Nasdaq,
“Companies by Industry,” (1 August 2017), online:
<www.nasdaq.com/screening/regions.aspx>. Across the entire U.S. there
have been between 912 to 1145 foreign companies registered and reporting
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission between 2006 and 2014
(this number includes companies traded on the Over the Counter Market).
See SEC, “International Registered and Reporting Companies”, online:
(2014)
<https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml>.
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Another aspect of complexity is the number of defendants
involved in a particular investigation or case. This issue
implicates not only the number of people who may have been
trading on the information, but also potentially the sources of the
information. The latter topic is not simply a matter of factual
complexity, which may demand more investigative resources,
but it is also a matter of the elements required under the tipping
regime of the respective jurisdictions. The U.S. regime is quite
complicated as a doctrinal matter, with the elements of tipping
somewhat murky. The more clearly delineated statutes in
Canada, however, pose a challenge for regulators because they
are required to show that the tipper was in a “special
relationship” with the issuer and that he or she passed on a
material fact or material change.
Panel A of Table 5 compares the mean number of
defendants in insider trading actions. Panel B of Table 5 presents
the results of a negative binomial regression, with the number of
defendants in an action as the dependent variable. We include an
indicator variable for U.S. actions as our variable of interest in
this regression. We also include a control variable for the number
of companies involved in the action, as a larger number of
companies may correlate with a larger number of defendants.
Thus, the U.S. variable captures the increment beyond that
provided by the U.S. having a larger average number of
companies in its actions.
Table 5: Defendants
Panel A: Average Number of Defendants
CA US
t-test
Defendants 1.45 2.31 -3.147**
+

p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Panel B: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of the
Number of Defendants
Variable
US

Coefficient
0.424**
(0.122)
Multiple Company 0.519**
(0.080)
Constant
0.284*
27

(0.118)
N
518
Pseudo r2
0.027
Dependent variable of negative binomial regression is the number of
defendants in an action. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we see that U.S.
investigations involve a significantly greater number of
defendants. This finding is consistent with greater resources on
the part of U.S. regulators. Pursuing chains of tipper-tippees may
require greater resources to investigate, favoring U.S. regulators.
Legal differences governing tipper-tippee liability between the
two countries may also be determinative.
To explore this possibility further, we code the type of
defendants in the insider trading actions. We examine whether a
tipper or tippee is included in the action. We also examine
whether a top insider was named as a defendant. A top insider is
defined as either a current or former member of the board of
directors or executive officer (including the CEO, CFO, President,
COO, General Counsel, Senior Vice President, Vice President, or
Treasurer). Table 6 compares incidence of these two types of
defendants for insider trading actions between the two countries.
Table 6: Type of Defendant in Action
CA
Tipper/Tippee 27.0%
+

US
57.4%

t-test
-4.609**

Top Insider
31.7% 32.7%
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

-0.144

Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the SEC is more than twice
as likely to pursue tippers or tippees, a difference significant at
the 1% level.95 By contrast, we see no significant difference in the
likelihood that a top insider will be pursued, inconsistent with
Hypothesis 5. We cannot say whether the lower percentage of
It is possible that the tipper/tippee numbers for the U.S. were inflated from
2010 onward due to increased insider trading enforcement against hedge
funds during this time period. To address this possibility, we compared the
incidence of tipper/tippee defendants in actions from 2005 to 2009 only. We
found that the incidence of tipper/tippees in Canada (20.0%) remains below
the incidence of tipper/tippees in U.S. actions (52.6%) for the 2005 to 2009
time period and this difference is significant at the 1% confidence level.
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tipping cases in Canada reflects greater compliance efforts or a
different standard of proof or enforcement focus. We note,
however, that in criminal and quasi-criminal matters, no
successful tipping case in Canada has been upheld on appeal.96
For the remainder of our tests, we focus on the specific
defendants associated with insider trading actions. We examine
the likelihood of a criminal case being pursued as part of the
insider trading action for a particular defendant. To examine this
question, we estimate a logistic regression with the dependent
variable coded as 1 if there is a criminal action for a defendant
based on the same set of facts as the civil insider trading action.
The regression is estimated on defendant-action level data. Our
independent variable of interest is the U.S., but we also include
control variables: the log of 1 plus the amount of profits gained
from the trading; indicator variables coded as 1 if a tipper or
tippee or top insider were named as defendants, which may
reflect culpability and/or enforcement priorities. We also include
an indicator variable, Fin Inst, if any defendant included in the
conspiracy is employed by a financial institution, such as a bank
or broker-dealer, which may face a higher level of scrutiny. (We
also include employees of accounting firms in this category, given
the regulatory scrutiny faced by that profession.) We present the
results in Table 7.

One of the most high-profile tipping cases in the recent past was the case
of R v Rankin, 2005 CarswellOnt 4068 (OCJ); R v Rankin (2006), 42 CR
(6th) 297 (ONSC); R v Rankin (2007), 216 CCC (3d) 481, 221 OAC 184 (Ont.
CA) [Rankin]. In this case, Andrew Rankin, a managing director in the
mergers and acquisitions department of RBC Dominions Securities, was
charged with 20 counts of insider trading and tipping under ss.76(1) and (2)
of the OSA. The evidence in the case was the testimony of the alleged tippee
and circumstantial evidence that documented the timing of the tippee’s
trades and his connection to Rankin. He was acquitted of the ten counts of
insider trading, but convicted on the tipping charges and sentenced to six
months in prison concurrent on each count. This case was significant
because it was the first Canadian case to yield a conviction of tipping.
However, when the case was overturned and leave to appeal denied, the case
came to stand as another example of how difficult enforcing insider trading
and tipping is.
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Table 7: Logistic Regression Analysis of Criminal Cases
Variable
US

Coefficient
2.197**
(2.76)
ln(Profits)
-0.001
(-0.03)
Tipper/Tippee 0.883**
(3.58)
Top Insider
0.751*
(2.45)
Fin Inst
1.049**
(3.94)
Constant
-4.607**
(-5.39)
N
1057
Pseudo r2
0.081
Dependent variable is coded as 1 if there is criminal prosecution
involving a defendant. Standard errors in parentheses. z-statistics in
parenthesis. Errors are clustered by action. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p
< 0.01.

We found that U.S. cases are significantly more likely to
result in a criminal referral leading to prosecution, consistent
with Hypothesis 6.97 The lower likelihood of criminal prosecution
in Canada may reflect a lack of experience and precedential
success in Canada with such cases (U.S. cases date to the 1970s),
more demanding elements or burden of proof, a lower budget for
enforcement, the diffuse regulatory structure, or a different
cultural understanding of the types of behavior that should be
proscribed by a criminal sanction.98
We cannot know if there was a criminal referral that the prosecutor
declined; we only see prosecutions actually brought.
98 The Hon. Peter de C Cory & Marilyn L Pilkington, “Critical Issues in
Enforcement” (2008), Canada Steps Up: The Report of the Task Force to
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada (Toronto, 2006), at 171-172,
191-197; Laura Nyantung Beny and Anita Anand, “Private Regulation of
Insider Trading in the Shadow of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence from
Canadian Firms”, online: (2013) 3:2 Harv Bus L Rev 227-229
<repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1641&context=articl
es> [Cory and Pilkington]. See generally, for the differences in enforcement
policies and priorities among the Canadian provincial commissions leading
to suboptimal enforcement as compared to a common regulator, and for a
comparison of enforcement activity and effectiveness in Canada and the
U.S., Poonam Puri, “Enforcement Effectiveness in the Canadian Capital
Markets”, Commissioned Reports and Studies. Paper 3 (2005), at 21-22, 2426.
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Our final set of comparisons looks at the outcomes of
enforcement actions for defendants in an action. First, we look at
the likelihood of settlement. All else equal, a more
respected/feared regulator should be better able to induce
defendants to settle an enforcement action. Conversely,
defendants may be more willing to take their chances in
adjudication if the enforcement agency is untested or has limited
resources. We assess this question using a logit model with the
dependent variable coded as 1 if a defendant settled an action and
0 if a defendant contested an action. The regression is estimated
on defendant-action-level data. We include the U.S. as our
independent variable of interest, along with the control variables
used in the regression presented in Table 7. We present the
results in Table 8.
Table 8: Logistic Regression Analysis of Settlement
Variable

Coefficient

US

N

1.610**
(4.02)
0.028
(0.79)
0.356
(1.08)
0.035
(0.10)
-0.407
(-1.18)
0.418
(0.91)
1,035

Pseudo r2

0.057

ln(Profits)
Tipper/Tippee
Top Insider
Fin Inst
Constant

Dependent variable is coded as 1 if case is settled for a defendant and
0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses. z-statistics in
parenthesis. Errors are clustered by action. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p
< 0.01.

We find that settlements are more likely in the U.S., with
the coefficient on the U.S. indicator variable positive and highly
significant. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 7,
suggesting that the SEC has greater leverage in settlement
negotiations relative to its Canadian provincial counterparts.
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We also examine the sanctions imposed in the
enforcement actions. We look at four sanctions commonly
imposed on defendants in insider trading actions: 1)
disgorgement plus pre-judgment interest; 2) monetary penalties;
3) industry bars, which preclude serving for a specified period of
time as an officer or director of a public company or serving in
the financial services industry; and 4) a permanent industry bar,
typically reserved for the most serious offenses. The first two
variables are linear amounts, which we use as the dependent
variable in OLS regressions. We code each of the enforcement
actions in our sample as 1 if a bar or permanent bar is imposed
for a defendant.99 We use these indicator variables as dependent
variables in our last two regressions. The U.S. indicator variable
is again the independent variable of interest, and we include the
same control variables that we used in Tables 7 & 8. The
regression is estimated on defendant-action-level data. We
present the results in Table 9.
Table 9: Regression Analysis of Sanctions
Variable
US

Disgorgement Monetary
& Interest
Penalty
1.691+
0.360
(1.67)
(1.45)

Industry Permanent
Bar
Bar
-1.971**
2.210**
(-3.75)
(5.52)

In(Profits)

0.866+
(1.90)

0.230+
(1.83)

0.0712**
(2.73)

0.0217
(0.76)

Tipper/Tippee

-4.317
(-1.37)

-1.106
(-1.50)

0.934**
(2.59)

1.268**
(3.44)

Top Insider

-0.176
(-0.06)

-0.413
(-0.70)

0.0796
(0.28)

0.589
(1.58)

Fin Inst

2.834+
(1.75)

0.870+
(1.93)

0.599*
(1.98)

0.372
(1.08)

Constant

-7.421*
(-2.08)
1021
0.068

-1.746+
(-1.77)
1022
0.012

1.166*
(2.46)
478

-2.640**
(-5.03)
320

0.110

0.193

N
adj. R2
pseudo R2

The number of observations is smaller for these regressions because under
U.S. law not all defendants would be eligible for a bar.
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Dependent variables are: 1) amount of disgorgement plus interest; 2) the
amount of the monetary penalties; 3) 1 if there is an industry bar; 4)
contingent upon an industry bar, coded as if there is a permanent bar. 1 & 2
are OLS regressions and 3 & 4 are logits. t-statistics and z-statistics in
parentheses. Errors are clustered by action. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Looking at the regressions for disgorgement and penalties, we
find that disgorgement amounts are marginally greater in the
U.S., but there is no significant difference in penalty amounts
between the two countries, inconsistent with Hypothesis 8A.
This result is not surprising given the standards used for
calculating these amounts, which are quite similar in the two
countries.
Turning to the regressions for industry bars, we see that
Canada is more likely to apply a bar as a sanction, but if a bar is
applied, the U.S. is more likely to make the bar permanent,
consistent with Hypothesis 8B. Among the other independent
variables, tippers or tippees are more likely than others to face an
industry bar and when they do, it is more likely to be permanent.
Similarly, those engaged in insider trading who are employed at
a financial institution are more likely to face an industry bar.
5. Conclusion
Our primary contribution has been to collect and analyze
original cross-border comparative data relating to insider
trading enforcement. We find certain distinct differences
between the two jurisdictions. To begin, U.S. investigations
involve a significantly greater number of defendants and these
defendants include a greater number of tippers and tippees
relative to Canada. This finding is consistent with U.S. regulators
having greater resources, but also with the historical inability of
securities regulators in Canada to secure convictions against
tippers.100
In terms of geographical reach, Canadian securities
regulators primarily concern themselves with prosecuting
insider trading in Canadian companies, while the SEC is more
willing to examine insider trading in companies incorporated
elsewhere. This broader focus on the part of the SEC may reflect
greater resources, but also a greater incidence of cross-listings in
the U.S., making it likely that the insider trading occurred on a
U.S. exchange, even if a company’s headquarters and operations
are located elsewhere.
100

See Rankin, supra note 96 and Cory and Pilkington, supra note 98.
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Regarding sanctions for insider trading, Canadian
securities regulators are more likely to apply a bar as a sanction,
such as banning individuals from participating in the capital
markets. However, that bar is more likely to be temporary rather
than permanent. The U.S. is also more likely to see settlement of
insider trading cases. In Canada, our findings are consistent with
Anand and Green.101 They show that settlements are less likely in
insider trading, market manipulation, and fraud-related cases
than in other cases such as improper trading or misuse of an
exemption from the prospectus requirement.
Do these results tell us anything about the effectiveness of
the centralized securities regime relied on in the U.S. relative to
the more diffuse regime in Canada? To the extent that a
centralized regulator has greater resources, including financial
wherewithal and expertise, these resources may allow enforcers
to bring more complex and extensive insider trading cases, for
example, as against company executives and their advisers as
well as cross-listed foreign firms. But, availability of resources is
only one of many factors that affect the incidence of insider
trading prosecutions; some factors are (partially) exogenous to
the regulator itself, such as the number of cross-listings in a
country.
Our findings do not demonstrate a need for systemic
reform in either jurisdiction and they certainly do not suggest
that centralized regulation necessarily provides more effective
enforcement. However, they do provide insight into the differing
points of regulatory emphasis in the two jurisdictions (such as
foreign versus domestic companies and bars versus other types
of sanctions). From a comparative perspective, our research thus
allows regulators to begin to evaluate whether their enforcement
approach is optimal on the basis of quantitative data. In the
Canadian context, some have argued that there might be benefits
to having one agency that houses both securities regulation and
criminal enforcement. While our results do not definitively
support the one agency position, we note that Puri,102 among
Anita Anand & Andrew Green, “Securities Enforcement as an Example of
Crisis-driven Regulation” (2018) 55 Int Rev L & Econ 41.
102 Poonam Puri, “A Model for Common Enforcement in Canada: The
Canadian Capital Markets Enforcement Agency and the Canadian Securities
Hearing Tribunal” (2008) Commissioned Reports and Studies. Paper 111,
online:
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1110
&context=reports>.
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others, has argued that while insider trading enforcement in
Canada could be implemented under the current system with 13
securities regulators and a passport, a common securities
regulator would be more effective.
Our research has some limitations, of course. To begin, we
have a limited number of data points on the Canadian side
although we endeavored to collect the entire population for our
period of study. We also do not have access to investigations in
Canada so we cannot know which cases the regulators initiated
but did not pursue for want of evidence, etc. A similar limitation
applies to the U.S. data, as insider trading investigations may not
come to light if the traded company is not brought into the
investigation.
We also see a need for more extensive research comparing
the Canadian and U.S. enforcement regimes. Insider trading
reflects only a fraction of the enforcement cases brought in either
jurisdiction. Moreover, it is an offense that typically focuses on
individual defendants who have abused a position of trust.
Fruitful comparisons could also be made of offenses more likely
to be committed by institutions, such as accounting
misstatements and bribery of foreign officials. We have begun to
undertake empirical work in these areas, but there are other
areas, such as narrative disclosures and continuing disclosure
obligations that also invite further scrutiny from a comparative
perspective.
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